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Mayo: The Baby Doe Rules and Texas's "Futility Law" in the NICU

THE BABY
BABY DOE RULES AND
AND TEXAS'S "FUTILITY
LAW"
LAW" IN THE NICU

Thomas William
William Mayo*
Mayo *
Thomas
INTRODUCTION
I. INTRODUCTION

The applicability
applicability of Texas's futility provision in the NICU and its
relationship to the Baby
Baby Doe rules are reasonably straightforward.
Nonetheless,
Nonetheless, many comments have been written about Texas'ss so"futility law,"
complimentary and others, not so
called "futility
law," some of them complimentary
much. The most serious critiques of the Texas futility provision,
however, are based upon assumptions that result from a fundamental
misreading of the law. After a brief discussion of the futility
provision and its principal features, this Essay will examine
examine the
misunderstandings
that
plague
many
critiques
of
the
law
and then
misunderstandings
of
proposed amendments to the law that address some of
offer a list of proposed
the actual deficiencies
deficiencies in the futility provision.
II. BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND
1999, Texas lawmakers'
In 1999,
lawmakers 1 set out to combine
combine three end-of-life
laws into one. 2 The primary
goal
was
to
harmonize
the three laws by
primary
by
inconsistencies in the witnessing
eliminating inconsistencies
witnessing provisions, adding and
sharpening some of the definitions,
sharpening
definitions, revising the authorized advancedirective forms, and adopting a consistent
and politically acceptable
3
3
rules.
liability
laws'
the
to
approach the laws' liability rules.
" Director, Cary M. Maguire Center for Ethics and Public Responsibility and Associate Professor,
• Director, Cary M. Maguire Center for Ethics and Public Responsibility and Associate
Dedman School
School of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. The legislature
I.
legislature was assisted
assisted by an advisory
advisory panel of which II have been a member since 1998.
Opinions offered
offered in this article are mine alone and should not be attributed to other
other members
members of the
group.
& SAFETY CODE ANN.
ANN. ch. 672 (1997);
2. The three
three laws were the Natural
Natural Death Act, TEx. HEALTH &
(1997);
Out-of-Hospital Do-Not-Resuscitate
Do-Not-Resuscitate law, id.
the Out-of-Hospital
id ch. 674; and the Durable Power
Power of Attorney
Attorney for Health
Ctv. PRAC.
& REMEDY CODE ch. 135 (1997).
Care law, TEx.
TEx. CIY.
PRAc. &
(1997).
3. Opposition to revisions to the liability rules (which replaced
replaced negligence with
with good faith as the
physicians) helped to derail
liability standard
standard for physicians)
derail a similar attempt to harmonize the three laws in 1997.
The result was vetoed by then-Governor
then-Governor Bush, see Proclamation
Proclamation by the Governor
Governor of Texas (June 20,
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legislature's advisory panel declared all provisions of
of
Early on, the legislature's
the three laws-those that were present in the statutes, as well as
those that were missing-to be on the table for discussion.
Accordingly, members of the advisory panel were encouraged
encouraged to
promote their "wish lists," subject to the understanding that no new
legislature unless it had the full
provision would be submitted to the legislature
4
backing of all members of the panel.
pane1.
provision to emerge
The most notable prOVISIon
emerge from the 1999
harmonization effort was the provision that dealt with medical-futility
medical-futility
disputes, particularly
particularly disputes between surrogate decision makers and
physicians over treatments deemed by the physicians to be
"inappropriate." Although it is often referred
referred to as the "Texas futility
"inappropriate."
law," this provision is a single subSection
-Section 166.046(e)
166.046(e) of
of
subSection55-Section
the Texas Health
Health &
& Safety Code-of
Code-of a large and complex
matrix
of
complex
of
6
6
related
"futility" never appears. To
related Sections
Sections in which the word "futility"
understand
Section 166.046(
166.046(e)
e) does and does not do, it may be
understand what Section
helpful to consider
166.046 (and related
related
consider how it fits into Section 166.046
provisions of the Texas Advance
Directives
Act)
as
a
whole.
Advance Directives
1997) (vetoing S.B. 414), at <http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/scannedivetoes/75/sb414.pdfflnavpanes=0>
<http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/scanned/vetoes/75/sb414.pdf#navpanes=0> (last
(last
1997)
visited June
June 23,
23, 2009), who then
then informally requested
requested that the drafting group
group take another
another shot at
harmonization
harmonization in 1999.
1999.
4. The panel was a diverse
diverse group,
group, including representatives
representatives from state agencies
agencies responsible
responsible for
for
paying for or
health-care professional
professional and industry
or providing end-of-life treatment, health-care
industry associations and
advocacy
individuals, and
and the Texas
Texas Right to Life and
and National
advocacy groups,
groups, a handful of hospitals, a few individuals,
Right to Life Committees. Members
Members of
of the advisory
advisory panel
panel were, of course, free to dissociate
dissociate themselves
themselves
from the fmal
final product, and keeping
keeping the panel together
together was viewed
viewed as essential
essential if the final
recommendation
recommendation was
was going to be politically viable. Some
Some of the history
history and a brief description of
of the
1998-1999 drafting effort
& Thomas
Thomas Win.
Wm. Mayo,
Mayo, Resolution of
ofFutility
Futility by
by
1998-1999
effort are set
set out in Robert
Robert L. Fine &
Due Process:
Experience with the Texas Advance Directives
Due
Process: Early Experience
Directives Act, 138
138 ANNALS
ANNALS INTERNAL
INTERNAL MED.
743, 744 (2003).
743,
(2003).
5. TEx. HEALTH
& SAFETY
HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 166.046
166.046 (Vernon
(Vemon Supp. 2001).
200 I).
6. Because
Because of the well-documented
well-documented failures of commentators
commentators to develop
develop a definition
defmition for "medical
"medical
futility"
see, e.g.,
e.g., Paul R.
R. Helft
Helft et
et al.,
aI., The Rise
Rise and Fall
Fall of the
futility" that
that could
could attract general
general agreement, see,
Futility
& Robert
Futility Movement, 343 NEw.
NEW. ENG.
ENG. J. MED.
MED. 293
293 (2000);
(2000); Jeffrey
JeftTey P. Bums &
Robert D. Truog,
Truog, Futility:
Futility: AA
Concept in Evolution, 132 CHEST 1987,
1987, 1988-89
1988-89 (2007)
(2007) (hereinafter
(hereinafter "Futility:
"Futility: A
A Concept in
Evolution"),
166.046(e) of the Texas
Evolution"), Section
Section 166.046(e)
Texas Advance
Advance Directives
Directives Act addresses
addresses disputes that arise when
when
patient
patient representatives
representatives ask for treatments
treatments that are deemed
deemed by the attending
attending physician
physician to be
be
"inappropriate,"
"inappropriate," a term
term that is
is arguably
arguably broader
broader and certainly
certainly no
no less
less inscrutable
inscrutable than "futile,"
"futile," cf
cf Jeffrey
JeftTey
P.
P. Bums &
& Robert
Robert D. Truog, Correspondence,
Correspondence, 134
134 CHEST
CHEST 888,
888, 888 (2008) (.'[l]nappropriate'
('''[I]nappropriate' has a
commonly
that no such meaning
meaning or
or
commonly understood
understood meaning
meaning or agreed-upon
agreed-upon definition.
definition. The
The truth
truth is that
definition
definition exists.").
exists.").
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disagreements over
Section 166.046 addresses various types of disagreements
end-of-life decisions, including both "classic right-to-die"
right-to-die" cases as
end-of-life
well as so-called "futility
"futility disputes," sometimes referred to as "reverse
right-to-die" (or, less charitably, "duty to die") cases. 7 Both types of
of
right-to-die"
disagreements
disagreements trigger the same set of procedural
procedural safeguards under the
8
law. First, a hospital ethics or medical committee9 must conduct a
review of the treatment dispute, with at least forty-eight hours' prior
notice to the surrogate d~cision
decision maker,lo
maker,1° who is entitled to attend the
review session. 1II The hospital is also obligated to provide the
surrogate
"Statement Explaining the Patient's Right to
surrogate with a detailed "Statement
12 and may
Transfer"
description
Transfer,,12
also provide an additional "written description
of the ethics or medical committee
committee review process and any other
3
care facility.'
health care
by the
adopted by
. . . adopted
policies and procedures
procedures ...
the health
facility.,,13
Once the review process is over, any decision shall be reduced to
14
writing, which will be given to the surrogate l4
and placed
placed in the
1
5
patient's medical record. 15 If anyone involved in the process
process
disagrees
disagrees with the outcome of the ethics committee's review, the
physician (with the assistance of the facility's staff) shall try to
7. The primary
primary difference
difference between
between the two types of disputes has to do with
with the identity of the party
who demands
demands more
care and
the party
party who
who resists the demand. In a "classic
who
more care
and the
"classic right-to-die"
right-to-die" case, the
family resists
resists further
physician argues for its continuation.
family
further aggressive
aggressive treatment
treatment and
and the treating
treating physician
continuation. The
cases of
Ann Quinlan
of Karen
Karen Ann
Quinlan and Nancy
Nancy Beth Cruzan
Cruzan are
are two
two of
of the
the best known
known of these "classic
"classic rightcases
to-die" cases.
In re
cert. denied,
denied,429
to-die"
cases. In
re Quinlan, 355 A.2d
A.2d 647,
647, cert.
429 U.S. 922 (N.J. 1976); Cruzan
Cruzan v. Dir.,
Dir., Mo.
Dep't of
Health, 497
497 U.S.
(1990). In futility cases, it is the patient's representative
of Health,
U.S. 261
261 (1990).
representative who demands a
Dep't
level
or type
level or
type of
of treatment-often
treatment--of'ten with
with the request that "everything
"everything be done"
done" to keep
keep the patient alivealive-and the
physicians who resist on the
and
the physicians
the ground that the requested
requested treatments
treatments would not
not produce
produce a benefit
for the patient. One of
diagnosed in a
of the earliest such
such cases
cases involved
involved Helga
Helga Wanglie, who
who was
was diagnosed
for
persistent vegetative
persistent
vegetative state and whose caregivers
caregivers sought
sought (unsuccessfully)
(unsuccessfully) to have her husband
husband replaced
replaced as
her guardian
withdrawal of ventilator support. See Futility:
her
guardian with someone more likely to consent to the withdrawal
Futility: A
Concept in Evolution,
Evolution, supra
supra note 6, at 1988.
1988.
Concept
8. Just as Section 166.046 applies
applies to both types
types of
of "right-to-die"
"right-to-die" disputes, it can
can be
be invoked by
patients, surrogates,
surrogates, and
and physicians
physicians alike.
9. Most
Most of these disputes are
are likely to arise
arise in a tertiarytertiary- or quaternary-care
quaternary-care facility, where
where there
there will
probably
If not, another
probably be
be an
an in-house
in-house ethics
ethics committee.
committee. If
another kind of "medical
"medical committee"
committee" is permitted
permitted by
the
(Vernon Supp. 2001).
the statute. TEX.
TEx. HEALTH
HEALTH &
& SAFETY
SAFETY CODE
CODE ANN.
ANN. §§ 166.046(a)
166.046(a)(Vernon
2001).
10.
10. Id.
Id. § 166.046(b)(2).
166.046(b)(2).
11.
II. Id.
Id. § 166.046(b)(4)(A).
I 66.046(b)(4)(A).
12.
12. Id.
Id §§
§§ 166.046(b)(3)(A),
166.046(b)(3)(A), 166.052.
166.052.
13.
166.046(b)(1).
13. Id.
Id § 166.046(b)(1).
14.
14. Id.
Id § 166.046(b)(4)(B).
166.046(b)(4)(B).
15.
15. TEx.
TEx. HEALTH
HEALTH &
& SAFETY CODE ANN.
ANN. § 166.046(c)
I 66.046(c) (Vernon
(Vernon Supp.
Supp. 2001).
2001).
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transfer the patient to another physician, an alternative care setting, or
another facility where the surrogate's treatment decision can be
16
with. 16
complied with.
Under Section 166.046(e),
166.046(e), a surrogate's
surrogate's demand for
"inappropriate" treatment
"inappropriate"
treatment is to be treated just like traditional "right to
committee
die" disputes, with the added proviso that if the ethics committee
agrees with the physician, life-sustaining
life-sustaining treatment shall be continued
continued
for at least ten days, during which time the physician
physician and facility
shall try to effect the patient's transfer. If no facility or physician is
found who will accept the transfer, at the end of the ten-day waiting
period, neither the facility nor the physician is obligated to continue
to provide life-sustaining
life-sustaining treatment. Finally, if all of the required
procedures
procedures in Section 166.046 are followed, the physician,
physician, facility,
and any health professional acting under the direction of the
physician are immune from civil and criminal
criminal 7 liability and
physician
licensing
appropriate
the
by
action
disciplinary
disciplinary
by the appropriate licensing board.1
board. 17
From 1999 to 2003, this procedural
safe
harbor
applied (with one
procedural
slight exception) only to disputes involving adult patients.'
patients. 188 In 2003
the legislature
legislature amended the Advance
Advance Directives
Directives Act so that Section
166.046
would
apply
to
minor
166.046
patients as well as adults. 19 At the
same time, the legislature added Section 166.010 to the Advance
Advance
Directives
Act
to
emphasize
that
the
Act
was
"subject
to
applicable
Directives
emphasize
"subject applicable
federal law and regulations
regulations relating to child abuse and neglect
neglect [i.e.,
the Baby doe rules] to the extent applicable
applicable to the state
state based on its

16.
16. Id.
Id. § 166.046(d).
166.046(d).
17.
17. Id.
Id. § 166.045(d).
166.045(d).
18.
originally enacted,
18. As
As originally
enacted, Section 166.046 applied
applied when a physician disagreed
disagreed with an advance
advance
directive
theory-but rarely
directive (including,
(including, in
in theory-but
rarely in
in practice-an
practice-an advance
advance directive
directive executed
executed on behalf
behalf of a
minor)
minor) or
or with
with aa treatment
treatment decision
decision on
on behalf
behalf of
of an
an incompetent
incompetent adult patient without
without a directive,
directive,
guardian,
166.046). This
guardian, or
or health care
care agent.
agent. S.B.
S.B. 1260,
1260, § 1.03
1.03 (1999)
(1999) (adding § 166.046).
This latter limitation
limitation
resulted
resulted from
from aa cross-reference
cross-reference to "a
"a treatment
treatment decision
decision under
under Section
Section 166.039,
166.039, which
which authorizes
authorizes
treatment
decisions for
applicability to
adult patients."
patients." Id.;
Id.; see also
also Section
Section 166.039's
166.039's limited applicability
treatment decisions
for certain
certain adult
adult patients.
19.
19. This
This was
was done by eliminating
eliminating Section
Section 166.046's
166.046's cross-reference
cross-reference to Section
Section 166.039
166.039 and
and
reworking the
care or
reworking
the definition
definition of
of "health
"health care
or treatment decision"
decision" to
to make itit clear
clear that it "includ[es]
"includ[es] such a
decision on
treatment
decision
on behalf
behalf of
of aa minor."
minor." S.B. 1320,
1320, §§
§§ 1I (amending
(amending definition
definition of "health
"health care
care or
or treatment
decision"),
decision"), 44 (eliminating
(eliminating cross-reference
cross-reference in
in Section
Section 166.046(a)
166.046(a) to Section
Section 166.039)
166.039) (2003).
(2003).
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20 This provision would appear
receipt of federal
federal funds.,
funds. ,,20
add little
little
This provision would appear to add
receipt
the implicit
implicit acknowledgement
acknowledgement in the governor's
governor's annual
or nothing to the
certification to
to the Department
Department of
of Health
Health and
and Human
Human Services
Services
certification
pursuant to the Baby
Baby Doe
Doe rules
rules that
that Texas
Texas has procedures
procedures for
pursuant
"the withholding
responding to reports
reports of medical neglect, including
including "the
responding
of medically
medically indicated
indicated treatment
treatment from disabled
disabled infants with
with life21
conditions."
threatening conditions. ,,21
threatening
Nothing
Nothing contained
contained in the Advance
Advance Directives
Directives Act
Act in general,
general,
Section
Section 166.046
166.046 specifically,
specifically, or the acknowledgement
acknowledgement of Baby
Baby Doe's
Doe's
applicability in Section 166.010
166.010 changed
changed the impact
impact of the Baby Doe
applicability
rules on clinical
clinical practice
practice in Texas. Before
Before 2003,
2003, if
if Child
Child Protective
Protective
was
treatment
indicated
Services
Services officials believed
believed that medically
medically indicated
being withheld from an infant, they could
could seek
seek a court order directing
designating the state agency as
the treatment
treatment to be provided or designating
temporary guardian
temporary
guardian for purposes
purposes of making treatment decisions.
After the 2003 amendments,
amendments, the same
same was true. The Advance
Advance
confers broad legal immunity on physicians,
physicians, facilities,
Directives Act confers
physicians,
professionals working under the direction of physicians,
and health professionals
of, or
make any change
change in the legal
legal status of,
or
but it does not purport to make
Services.
the rules that are enforced by, Child Protective Services.

OBJECTION TO THE ADVANCE
III. THE PRINCIPAL
PRINCIPAL OBJECTION
AnvANCE DIRECTIVES
DIRECTIVES ACT

166.046
Two of the most persistent and insightful critics of Section 166.046
Thaddeus Mason Pope. Their
Professor Thaddeus
are Dr. Robert Truog and Professor
procedurally deficient
1999 law is procedurally
objection is that the 1999
deficient because
because
core objection
166.010 and language
20. S.B.
S.B. 1320,
1320, § 2 (2003)
(2003) (adding § 166.010
language quoted in text). The meaning of this
unremarkable proposition
somewhat obscure. It may simply recognize the unremarkable
provision
provision is somewhat
proposition (even in Texas!)
that federal law applies as long as the precondition for the application of federal law continues
continues to be
satisfied. It does not appear to settle the question whether the Baby Doe rules (i) are merely a federalprogram or (ii)
(ii) establish a federal
state funding mechanism for the state's child protective services program
the Baby Doe rules as
standard of care for disabled
disabled infants. Texas courts have been disinclined
disinclined to see the
standard
118 S.W.3d 758, 771 (Tex. 2003)
anything
anything more than a funding mechanism.
mechanism. Miller v. HCA, Inc., 118
court's
"federal funding regulations"
(describing
(describing the Baby Doe rules as "federal
regulations" and agreeing with the lower court's
conclusion that the question of a hospital's liability for treating a newborn over the objections of her
conclusion
parents
parents "is governed by state law rather than federal funding authorities").
5106a(b)(2)(B) (2006).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(2006).
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due-process safeguards against biased,
of the absence of minimal due-process
substantively flawed, or otherwise inappropriate decision-making
decision-making by
substantively
treating physicians. In particular, they decry the Advance Directives
Act's failure to provide for judicial review and its reliance upon an
mechanism that is implemented
implemented by the hospital's
hospital's
extrajudicial review mechanism
"insiders" whose
ethics committee,
committee, which they criticize as staffed by "insiders"
lack of independence
independence fails to meet even minimum standards of
of
fairness. 22
decisional fairness?2
due-process criticism starts off right but ends up seriously
The due-process
wrong. The advisory panel very consciously chose to provide an
intramural ethics committee review of "futility disputes"
disputes" (as well as
disputes involving surrogates'
surrogates' refusal of continued treatment). The
advantages over a
in-house ethics committee
committee approach offered real advantages
judicial forum. First, members of the ethics committee
committee bring
expertise
general-jurisdiction
expertise to the controversy, an expertise that general-jurisdiction
trial judges usually lack. Second, the members of the ethics
committee may not include
committee
include physicians with direct patient-care
responsibility. There is no particular reason to believe that such a
committee would routinely rubber-stamp their physician-colleagues
physician-colleagues
committee
positions in the context
166.046 review, short of a deepcontext of a Section 166.046
seated distrust of hospital workers
and
volunteers. Third, there is little
workers
in the training
training or experience
experience judges receive to reflexively
reflexively believe that
judicial
decision-making in
judicial review should
should be the gold standard
standard for decision-making
end-of-life disputes. To be sure,
end-of-life
sure, judges are experts at due process,
process, but
are they equally expert
in
the
realm
of
medical
decision-making?
medical decision-making?
expert
One other
other concern motivated me to prefer
prefer an ethics
ethics committee
committee
review
1998-1999, and I still find it persuasive
review over a judicial
judicial one in 1998-1999,
22.
e.g., Thaddeus Mason Pope, Multi-Institutional
22. See, e.g.,
Multi-Institutional Healthcare
Healthcare Ethics Committees:
Committees: The
Procedurally
Procedurally Fair
Fair Internal
Internal Dispute
Dispute Resolution
Resolution Mechanism,
Mechanism, 31
31 CAMPBELL
CAMPBELL L. REv. 257,
257, 274-99 (2009);
Thaddeus
Thaddeus Mason
Mason Pope,
Pope, Medical
Medical Futility
Futility Statutes:
Statutes: No Safe Harbor
Harbor to
to Unilaterally
Unilaterally Refuse Life-Sustaining
Life-Sustaining
Treatment, 75
79-80 (2008);
Treatment,
75 TENN.
TENN. L. REv.
REv. 1,
1,79-80
(2008); Robert
Robert D. Truog, Tackling Medical Futility in Texas, 357
357
NEW ENG.
1990-91. The
ENG. J. MED.
MED. 1I (2007);
(2007); Futility:
Futility: A
A Concept in Evolution, supra
supra note
note 6,
6, at
at 1990-91.
substitution
substitution of
of aa hospital
hospital ethics committee
committee hearing
hearing for aa judicial
judicial one
one also
also lies
lies at the heart
heart of Professor
Professor
Nora O'Callaghan's
O'Callaghan's critique
critique of
of Section 166.046,
166.046, see
see Nora O'Callaghan,
O'Callaghan, Dyingfor
for Due Process:
Process: The
Unconstitutional
Unconstitutional Futility
Futility Provisions
Provisions of the Texas Advance Directives
Directives Act,
Act, 60
60 BAYLOR
BAYLOR L. REv.
REv. 625
(2008), although
O'Callaghan's criticisms
although Professor O'Callaghan's
criticisms go considerably
considerably further than the realm
realm of
of duedueprocess.
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today. As far back as the first state supreme court's decision in a
case-that of the New Jersey Supreme
Supreme Court in In re
"right to die" case-that
23
23
Quinlan -there
-there has been a recognition
Quinlan
recognition that the possibility of legal
liability may weigh heavily on the physician
physician on whose objective
judgment
everyone involved in the patient's care should have the
judgment everyone
right to rely.24
rely.24 Without some measure
measure of protection, physicians might
dispute-avoidance strategies.
seriously consider
consider adopting one or more dispute-avoidance
One strategy
involves
passively
going
along with everything
strategy
passively
everything the
of
surrogate decision maker asks for. This represents an abdication of
autonomy") and is not
responsibility (under the guise of "respect
"respect for autonomy")
necessarily in the best interests of the patient or anyone else. A
second dispute-avoidance
dispute-avoidance strategy would be to implement
implement the
physician's
consultation with
physician's own preferred
preferred treatment plan without consultation
the family or others with a significant role to play: no disclosure
disclosure and
alternatives, no informed
informed consent, no
discussion of treatment alternatives,
transparency, and no accountability. In many cases this strategy
strategy
would need to be implemented discretely, perhaps
undertreating
perhaps by undertreating
an acquired
acquired infection
infection or simply not offering a third or fourth lifeadverse event for a
sustaining intervention in the face of the latest adverse
patient
experiencing
multi-system
organ
failure.
Neither
patient experiencing multi-system
Neither of these
approaches is what most people would consider optimal medical care,
but both would avoid the adverse publicity, bad feelings, depositions,
to
and time in court that are entailed
entailed by judicial review. It is not hard to
23.
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647
23. In re Quinlan,
647 (N.J. 1976).
24. Id.
Id. at 668. The New
"fear of
New Jersey
Jersey Supreme
Supreme Court seemed to express some concern about the "fear
of
personal
"independent objectivity,"
personal retaliation"
retaliation" on physicians'
physicians' "independent
objectivity," as well as the court's desire that
"physicians, in
in the
pursuit of
of their
their healing
healing vocation,
vocation, [be
[be freed]
contamination by self"physicians,
the pursuit
freed] from possible contamination
self-protection concerns which would inhibit their independent
independent medical judgment
interest or self-protection
judgment for the
benefit of their dying patients."
Id. at 668. In virtually
patients." /d.
virtually the same breath,
breath, the court expressed its reluctance
to confer
end-of-life disputes as is enjoyed
physicians in end-of-life
enjoyed by judges
judges and
confer the same type of immunity on physicians
Id. Professor
reluctance in her critique of Section
grand jurors. Id.
Professor O'Callaghan picks up on the court's reluctance
166.046,
supra note
166.046, see Nora
Nora O'Callaghan,
O'Callaghan, supra
note 22, at 574,
574, but she completely misconstrues
misconstrues the New Jersey
Supreme Court's ultimate message.
message. The court went on to say that some
some type of review
review of physician
decision-making in end-of-life
screening out, so to speak, a case which might
end-of-life cases would be useful
useful "in
"in screening
contaminated by less than
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 670. But
be contaminated
than worthy motivations
motivations of family of physician."
physician." Quinlan,
contrary to Professor O'Callaghan's
O'Callaghan's implication, the court favored
favored the routine use of multi-disciplinary
multi -disciplinary
ethics committees
confirm such
be
committees rather than "applying
"applying to a court to confmn
such decisions[,
decisions[, which] would generally be
inappropriate not only because that would be
encroachment upon the medical profession's
be a gratuitous encroachment
profession'S
competence, but because
because it would be impossibly cumbersome."
Id.
field of competence,
cumbersome." /d.
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imagine
imagine why a physician,
physician, whose own judgments
judgments and actions control
both dispute-avoidance
dispute-avoidance strategies, might view one or the other to be
166.046(a)'s
preferable to litigation. With this in mind, Section 166.046(a)'s
committee tries to steer a course
interdisciplinary ethics committee
review by an interdisciplinary
of
judicial review
review and the Charybdis of
between the Scylla of judicial
unfettered, unexamined
unexamined physician
physician discretion.
166.046 seem
seem
More fundamentally, however, the critics of Section 166.046
to have gotten wrong the whole matter of the availability
availability of judicial
166.046 does not preclude
review. Put simply, Section 166.046
preclude resort to the
25
courts by families that are motivated
motivated to seek judicial review.25
166.046 that explicitly
To be sure, there is nothing in Section 166.046
26
provides
During the advisory
advisory panel's
panel's
provides for judicial
judicial review. 26
discussions in 1998 and 1999, however, there was widespread
agreement that judicial
agreement
judicial review would be available, if desired, through
the usual routes by which declaratory judgments
judgments and injunctions are
obtained in Texas. The panel considered spelling out the process in
the Advance Directives
Directives Act, but rejected that option as unnecessarily
unnecessarily
redundant.27
The
panel's
preference
for
an
extrajudicial
27
panel's preference
extrajudicial forum for
the review of end-of-life
end-of-life disputes, however, does not imply a
complete
complete rejection of judicial
judicial review if that is desired. The New
of
25. I offer the following interpretation
interpretation of the availability ofjudicial
of judicial review
review based
based upon my reading of
of a belief that formal judicial review
the Advance Directives Act as it is written and not out ofa
review is or ought
ought
to be required as a normative matter. Apart from the serious "state
"state action"
action" objection to any due-process
analysis (at least with respect
due-process principles
principles applied to the statutory
respect to private
private hospitals),
hospitals), even if due-process
scheme, state legislatures have
have the option of providing a reasonable alternative
alternative to full-blown judicial
judicial
multidisciplinary hospital
review. The Advance Directive
Directive Act's scheme-independent
scheme-independent review by a multidisciplinary
ethics committee with judicial
judicial review that ensures that the procedural
procedural requirements of the law have been
satisfied-is just such a reasonable alternative
alternative to full-blown judicial review in most cases.
satisfied-is
26. One provision of the Advance
Advance Directives Act provides that family members who disagree
disagree with a
behalf of an incompetent patient with no advance directive may apply
surrogate treatment decision on behalf
for temporary
& SAFETY CODE ANN.
temporary guardianship under
under the Texas Probate Code. TEX. HEALTH &
ANN.
§ 166.039(g) (Vernon Supp. 2001). A second provision authorizes
authorizes certain persons to commence
commence an
action to request that a medical power of attorney be revoked because
because of undue influence or the
the
incompetent at the time the medical power of attorney
attorney was executed. Id. § 166.165.
166.165. A
principal was incompetent
166.046(d).
third provision
provision deals with requests to extend the 10-day waiting
waiting period
period provided by Section 166.046(d).
See infra
infra note 29. It would be an unwarranted
unwarranted inference
inference from the presence
presence of this judicial-review
judicial-review
precluded because of the absence of such express
Section
language that judicial review is precluded
express language
language in Section
166.046.
review
27. Some members of the advisory panel may also have wanted to avoid encouraging
encouraging judicial
judicial review
by spelling out the process
Advance Directives Act, thus defeating the preferred
process in the Advance
preferred extrajudicial
extrajudicial
review
mechanism that was at the heart of Section 166.046.
166.046.
review mechanism
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Quinlan case made exactly the same
Jersey Supreme
Supreme Court in the Quinlan
point after it announced its preference
preference for ethics committee review in
end-of-life disputes: "[t]his
"[tihis is not to say that in the case of an
end-of-life
otherwise justiciable controversy
controversy access to the courts
courts would be
foreclosed; we speak rather of a general practice and procedure.,,28
procedure. 28
There is, of course, language in Section 166.046 that limits the
grounds on which a trial court may extend the ten-day waiting period
provided
166.046(e), 29 and Section 166.045(d) confers
provided by Section 166.046(e),29
immunity upon "[a]
"[a] physician, health professional
professional working under the
direction of a physician, or health care facility ...
. . . if the person has
166.046. "30 There
complied with the procedures
procedures outlined
outlined in Section
Section 166.046.,,30
are a number of good reasons to decline to read these provisions
provisions as
precluding
precluding judicial review of disputes under Section 166.046.
court's
As a threshold matter, any arguable limitation on a district court's
jurisdiction
determination
jurisdiction to entertain
entertain a lawsuit must depend upon a determination
the
statute
that
in which the alleged limitation
limitation appears
appears applies to the
parties and their dispute. In the context of the Advance
Advance Directives
Directives
Act, this means that a court could only find its jurisdiction
jurisdiction to be
governed by the Advance
limited if it first found that the dispute was governed
Advance
31
provision,
immunity
generic
Act's
the
of
case
Directives Act. In the
the case of the Act's generic immunity provision,31
the Act (and its immunities and limitations, if any, on trial court
or
jurisdiction) would not apply if the court found that the physician or
health
care" when
health care facility failed "to exercise
exercise reasonable
reasonable care"
of
applying the patient's
patient's advance
advance directive. Various other provisions of
the Advance Directives Act invoke the standard of "reasonable
"reasonable
32 or "the prevailing
33
prevailing standard of medical
medical care.
care.,,33
medical judgment
judgment,,32
In like fashion, if a court found one or more of these standard-of-care
standard-of-care
provisions
to
have
been
violated,
provisions
there would presumably
presumably be no
28. Quinlan,
Quinlan, 355 A.2d
A.2d at
at 670.
670.
29.
HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE
CODE ANN.
ANN. § 166.046(g)
29. TEX.
TEx. HEALTH
& SAFETY
166.046(g) (Vernon Supp. 2001)
2001) (requiring
(requiring court to find,
"by aa preponderance
preponderance of the evidence, that there is aa reasonable
"by
reasonable expectation
expectation that aa physician
physician or
or health
care facility
facility that will honor the
the patient's
patient's directive
directive will be found if the time extension is granted").
30. Id.
Id. § 166.045(d).
31. Id,
31.
Id. § 166.044.
32. E.g.,
id.§§ 166.002(4), (8), (10),
(13), 166.033,
166.033, 166.052.
E.g., id.
(10), (13),
33.
id.§§ 166.002(9), (13),
(13), 166.033.
33. E.g., id.
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warrant
warrant to apply the immunity provision or the limitation on the
court's power to extend the ten-day period. In brief, if the Advance
Directive
procedural requirements
requirements have not
Directive Act's substantive and procedural
been satisfied, the end-of-life
end-of-life dispute is outside the Act.34
34 At a
minimum, a reviewing
of
reviewing court would need to conduct some sort of
substantive
challenged the substance
substantive review in a case that challenged
substance of the
physician's position, to determine
determine whether the immunities applied,
and the same should be true of the alleged limitation on judicial
review itself.
Also, notwithstanding any limitation
limitation on the court's power to
extend
extend the ten-day waiting period, Texas courts undoubtedly have
inherent jurisdiction
jurisdiction to preserve the status quo while they explore the
existence
existence of their own jurisdiction. 35 Thus, most courts that have
been confronted with a dispute under Section
166.046 have not
Section 166.046
hesitated
hesitated to issue a temporary injunction until the issues-including
issues-including
the existence of a cause of action and subject-matter
subject-matter jurisdictionjurisdictioncould
could be sorted out.
judge would allow a patient
patient
Finally, it is highly unlikely that a trial judge
to die in a contested
contested case without first exploring the merits of the
parties' positions. Similarly, it is equally unlikely
unlikely that a hospital,
parties'
once it has been drawn
into
a
judicial-review
drawn
judicial-review proceeding, would
would
insist on the strict application of the ten-day waiting period and
and
discontinue
discontinue life-sustaining treatment
treatment while the case was pendente lite.
lite.
The ten-day
ten-day limit, after all, ends with permission
permission to discontinue lifesustaining
treatment,
not
a
command
sustaining treatment,
command to do so. Unless a strong case
could be made that continued
of
continued treatment was the literal equivalent
equivalent of
torture-a rarity, to be sure-the hospital would be ill-advised to
torture-a
34. This argument is a little harder, but not impossible, to make with respect to the immunity
id.
provision that applies solely to disputes under Section
Section 166.046. Neither the immunity provision, id.
§ 166.045(d), nor § 166.046 itself contains a standard-of-care
standard-of-care provision. It would make very little sense,
physician's
however, to apply the immunities to an end-of-life
end-of-life dispute under Section 144.046 when the physician's
judgment is wildly outside the standard
standard of care, considering how liberally that standard is festooned
throughout other parts of the Advance
Advance Directives Act. (This should
should be a rare event, however, if the
ethics committee
committee conducts
conducts a competent review.)
review.) If Texas courts refused to read standard-of-care
standard-of-care
requirement into Section 166.046,
166.046, I would
requirement
would certainly support an amendment that made such a
requirement explicit.
requirement
35. See.
See, e.g., Dolenz
Dolenz v. Vail, 200 S.W.3d
S.W.3d 338 (Tex. App. 2006).
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discontinue life-sustaining
life-sustaining treatment before the court had an
surrogate decision maker's
maker's
opportunity to address the merits of the surrogate
petition.
IV. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
AMENDMENTS

Experience with the Advance
Experience
Advance Directives Act and service on six
hospital ethics committees during the past ten years, as well as the
well-considered suggestions of both critics and supporters of the law,
well-considered
suggest that a number of amendments
amendments would make the law work
more effectively, more ethically, and more fairly. What follows is a
brief list 6of suggested
suggested amendments and brief explanations
explanations in support
3
36
them.
of
ofthem.
Judicial review. As the discussion in the previous Part makes
Directives Act would not
clear, a reasonable
reasonable reading of the Advance Directives
preclude substantive
substantive judicial review, at least in cases where a
plausible case can be made that the physician's judgments
judgments or actions
fall below a reasonable
reasonable standard
standard of care. If it were
were necessary
necessary to
preserve the essential
essential structure
structure of the law, including Section 166.046,
from a finding of unconstitutionality, the availability
availability of judicial
review could
be
made
more
explicit.
As
a
starting
"reasonable
could
starting point, "reasonable
166.046, so that its
medical judgment"
judgment" could be added to Section 166.046,
express language
language was brought into line with other parts of the
Advance Directives Act and provided a basis for substantive review
Advance
of the medical decision-making
decision-making involved
involved in the case. If something
more explicit
explicit were necessary, the change should be made. Nothing,
in my view, would be lost by making more explicit a judicial-review
judicial-review
37
rule that is already latent in the Act. 37
36. Any number of other amendments-some
substantive-should be
amendments-some technical,
technical, others more substantive--should
considered. The Advance
considered.
Advance Directives Act is the proverbial
proverbial result of sausage-making
sausage-making at its most extreme,
extreme,
and in its current
current form, it represents
represents the best that could have been coaxed
coaxed out of a very diverse advisory
panel made up of individuals with quite different agendas. What follows is my list of the changes that
deserve the most urgent consideration.
requirements of due
37. I continue to believe, however, that the existing statutory scheme meets the requirements
process and that the operation
improved by more frequent resort to the courts.
operation of the Act would not be improved
See supra
supra note 25.
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Section
Limit the scope of the immunity available under Section
166.046. If there is doubt about the availability
availability of judicial review in
of
cases in which Section 166.046 is invoked, the broad immunity of
Section 166.045(
166.045(d)
is
one
of
the
principal
reasons
d)
reasons for that doubt. The
immunity from criminal
criminal liability should be preserved,
preserved, as should the
the
immunity from disciplinary action by appropriate
appropriate licensing boards,
but the immunity from civil liability could be limited to monetary
damages, making it clear
clear that injunctive relief would still be available
as a remedy.
166.046. The Advance Directives
Limit the scope of Section 166.046.
Directives Act
Act
was never designed to provide a process or an answer for all end-oflife treatment decisions and disputes, let alone all "futility
"futility disputes."
Instead, the statute was intended to provide some level of protection
protection
for providers in those "core"
"core" cases in which public policy recognized
recognized
38
a need for a legislative solution.
solution?8
Section 166.046 applies to end-oflife disputes regardless
regardless of whether the patient
patient is competent
competent or
or
incompetent, and regardless of whether the patient has an irreversible
or terminal condition. In practice,
practice, I am aware of only one
"inappropriate treatment"
treatment" provision of
(nonjudicial) case in which the "inappropriate
of
166.046 was invoked to overrule the treatment decision of a
Section 166.046
patient who had decision-making
decision-making capacity. Although competent
patients
patients are theoretically
theoretically just as capable of demanding
demanding inappropriate
treatment
treatment as surrogate decision makers, the latter are the source of
of
overwhelming majority
conflict with physicians
physicians in the overwhelming
majority of cases. The
law should be limited to apply only when the patient lacks decisionmaking capacity. There is good reason to push disputes with
competent
competent patients
patients outside the protective ambit of Sections
166.045(d) and 166.046,
166.045(d)
166.046, not least because competent
competent patients
patients should
enjoy a presumption of knowing best what they want for themselves
themselves
in the way of end-of-life
care.
Their
wishes
should
be
overruled
only
end-of-life
in the most extreme
extreme cases, if at all, and these are cases in which the
presumably the reason that the Advance
38. This is presumably
Advance Directives Act (as
(as well as its predecessor
predecessor statute)
statute)
made it clear that nothing in the Act "impairds]
"impair[s] or supersede[s] any legal right or responsibility
responsibility a person
of life-sustaining treatment in a lawful
......"
may have to effect
effect the withholding
withholding or withdrawal
withdrawal oflife-sustaining
lawful manner
manner ....
TEx.
HEALTH &
& SAFETY
SAFETY CODE
CODE ANN.
166.048 (Vernon Supp. 2001). See a/so
also id §§ 166.100,
166.100, 166.166.
166.166.
ANN. § 166.048
TEx. HEALTH
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statutory immunity
166.045(d)
broad statutory
immunity of Sections
Sections 166.045(
d) and 166.046 should
not be needed
needed to ensure that the individuals
individuals and health care facilities
involved are not subject to legal liability.
166.046 should be limited to disputes over
In addition, Section
Section 166.046
patients"-that is, to patients who
treatment decisions for "qualified
"qualified patients"--that
39 If
condition?9
have been certified
certified to have a terminal
terminal or irreversible condition.
If
limited even further so that the law applied
only
to
patients
with
applied
of
terminal conditions, the law would pose little of the risk of
discrimination
advocacy groups have publicly
publicly
discrimination about which disability advocacy
worried. If there are patients with irreversible
irreversible conditions
conditions who need to
be protected
against
the
overly
aggressive
treatment
choices of their
their
protected
surrogates,
166.046 to
surrogates, the case should be made for extending Section 166.046
them as well.
dispute-resolution-style ethics
Require a prior informal dispute-resolution-style
consultation.
Section
166.046
literally
of
166.046 literally allows for the invocation
invocation of
consultation.
the statutory
statutory process
process described in that Section without any prior
prior
attempt to resolve the dispute. Many Texas hospitals seem to have
gravitated
gravitated toward a two-step
two-step process, even though it is not required
by the statute. It should be required
required of all hospitals, however, as a
"best practice"
practice" that would give all parties a chance to find an
acceptable
acceptable middle ground
ground without going directly to the formal
statutory
statutory process. The statutory process does provide
provide an opportunity
to resolve the disagreement, but it is not as well suited to that purpose
purpose
40
as an informal ethics consultation would be.4°
Extend the time deadlines in Section
Section 166.046.
166.046. Current law
guarantees
hours' advance notice of the
guarantees surrogates
surrogates at least forty-eight hours'
41 and a minimum of ten days of post-review
ethics committee review 41
minimum
post-review
life-sustaining
physician and health care facility
life-sustaining treatment while the physician

39. Id.
Id. § 166.031(2).
166.031(2).
166.046 certain
requirements for ethics
40. It might also be possible to write into Section 166.046
certain minimum requirements
ethics
committees and their members. I am not hopeful
hopeful that an attempt to "statutorify"
"statutorify" ethics committees'
committees'
membership and processes would be successful, but the effort has a chance
chance to address
address concerns
concerns that
many ethics committees are not sufficiently
independent and
sufficiently trained or attuned
attuned to their
their role to provide
provide independent
professional review in end-of-life
end-of-life disputes.
professional
41. TEx.
TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE
ANN. §166.046(b)(2)
§166.046(b)(2) (Vernon Supp.
2001).
& SAFETY
CODE ANN.
Supp.2001).
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42 These timelines
attempt to transfer the patient to a willing provider. 42
have been criticized
criticized as too short to provide families with a realistic
opportunity
opportunity to prepare
prepare for the review consult
consult or a fair chance to
identify a willing provider. These criticisms fail to take into account
invoked that most
the days or weeks before Section 166.046 is invoked
hospitals have spent attempting to arrange for a transfer. The
statutory minimums, however, may in some cases be too short to be
workable for some families. The time limits could easily be extended
extended
weekdays' (rather than calendar
calendar
to provide
provide a minimum number of weekdays'
(five) or during which
days') notice before the review consult occurs (five)
which
the attempt to transfer
transfer shall take place (ten). At a minimum, the law
should encourage facilities to be flexible in applying the time
requirements
reasonable
requirements of Section
Section 166.046 in order to meet the reasonable
needs of families and to avoid treating minimum time requirements
as setting upper limits.
Require hospitals to otTer
offer another informal dispute-resolutiondispute-resolutionstyle ethics consult after the expiration of the ten-day waiting
period. The ten-day waiting period may develop potentially
potentially
significant
significant information, even if no transfer
transfer has been arranged. The
patient's condition may have changed, or it may have stayed
stayed the
same. Treatment
Treatment alternatives may have been tried with various
outcomes. And the fact that no provider has been found who is
itself. Any or all
willing to accept the transfer is a significant fact in itself.
of this new information
information might contribute to an agreed-upon
agreed-upon
resolution of the end-of-life
end-of-life treatment dispute. A
A follow-up ethics
consultation should be considered
"best practice"
practice" unless it is
consultation
considered a "best
surrogate decision maker.
rejected by the surrogate

v.

V. CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

Unilateral
Unilateral withdrawal
withdrawal of life-sustaining
life-sustaining treatment
treatment should not be
done casually and should never be a first resort to settle end-of-life
treatment
treatment disputes. Proper regard for the values of the patient
patient and the
42. Id.
166.046(e).
[d. § 166.046(e).
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choices
choices of the surrogate
surrogate decision maker should ordinarily counsel a
slow process
process that ends in unilateral action only as a last resort.
There are, however, cases in which unilateral withdrawal
withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment
treatment is the only course that keeps faith with the duty
to do no harm. When that is the case, the due-process safe harbor
offered
offered by the Texas Advance Directives
Directives Act is a reasonable
legislative attempt to balance
balance all of the interests of the various parties
without sacrificing
patient care. Due process values,
sacrificing basic tenets of patient
including substantive
judicial
review,
are more available
substantive
available under the
Act than many critics
critics have assumed, but there are still ways for the
law to be improved for the benefit
benefit of patients, family decision
decision
makers, and health care providers.
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